Against the backdrop of funding challenges in the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), to conduct an in-depth analysis of the financial game dynamics between developed and developing countries and explore effective pathways for optimizing financial cooperation mechanisms, this study draws upon the “Global Public Goods” theory and the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, employing a combined methodological approach of comparative case analysis, static evolutionary game modeling, and numerical simulation analysis. It systematically examines the financial game dynamics, dissects the financial interaction mechanisms, and verifies the stability of game equilibria and their evolutionary pathways. The results indicate that national interests and international public opinion pressure are core factors affecting strategic choices. Developed countries choose “active cooperation” or “passive cooperation” in financial aid based on their interests and public pressure, while developing countries choose between “action” and “inaction” based on public pressure. The higher a developed country’s international reputation and environmental benefits, the more likely it is to “actively cooperate”. The greater the international reputational loss a developing country incurs, the more it is spurred to “act”. Developed and developing countries need to find a long-term stable equilibrium in funding games to realize rational allocation and efficient utilization of resources. This research offers a theoretical basis for targeted desertification funding policies and contributes to advancing global desertification governance. 

desertification control, funding game, international cooperation, evolutionary game, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)