针对FPGA实现的AES密码芯片的相关性电磁分析攻击

北京大学学报（自然科学版）

针对FPGA实现的AES密码芯片的相关性电磁分析攻击

张潇,崔小欣,魏为,黄颖,廖凯,廖楠,于敦山

北京大学信息科学技术学院微电子学研究院, 北京 100871;

收稿日期:2013-04-05 出版日期:2014-07-20 发布日期:2014-07-20

Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks against an FPGA Implementation of AES

ZHANG Xiao, CUI Xiaoxin, WEI Wei, HUANG Ying, LIAO Kai, LIAO Nan, YU Dunshan

Institute of Microelectronics, School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871;

Received:2013-04-05 Online:2014-07-20 Published:2014-07-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过研究相关性电磁分析(CEMA)攻击方法, 构建电磁泄漏信息采集和数据处理平台, 对基于现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)实现的AES-128密码算法进行近场相关性电磁分析攻击。攻击结果表明, 该平台能够获取密码芯片工作时的电磁泄漏信息，并通过分析获取AES第10轮加密的全部16个字节密钥。经过优化数据处理, 相关性电磁分析攻击的效率得到很大提高, 攻击所需的数据组数大大下降。

Abstract: To study the vulnerability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against electromagnetic side channel attacks, based on the method of correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) attack, the authors built a platform to acquire EM emanation and process data, then performed a near-field CEMA attack against an FPGA implementation of AES-128. The results indicate that the platform is able to acquire the EM emanation of the encryption chip, and can retrieve all the 16 bytes of the 10th roundkey of AES. After the optimization of processing data, the efficiency of CEMA is highly enhanced, namely the data needed to exploit the correct roundkey is greatly reduced.

Key words: AES, FPGA, CEMA, EM emanation

中图分类号:

TN47

张潇,崔小欣,魏为,黄颖,廖凯,廖楠,于敦山. 针对FPGA实现的AES密码芯片的相关性电磁分析攻击[J]. 北京大学学报（自然科学版）.

ZHANG Xiao,CUI Xiaoxin,WEI Wei,HUANG Ying,LIAO Kai,LIAO Nan,YU Dunshan. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks against an FPGA Implementation of AES[J]. Acta Scientiarum Naturalium Universitatis Pekinensis.

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https://xbna.pku.edu.cn/CN/Y2014/V50/I4/647