北京大学学报(自然科学版)

轻量级分组密码KeeLoq的故障攻击

游建雄1,李瑞林1,李超1,2   

  1. 1. 国防科学技术大学理学院, 数学与系统科学系,长沙 410073; 2. 中国科学院软件研究所, 信息安全国家重点实验室, 北京100190;
  • 收稿日期:2010-05-15 出版日期:2010-09-20 发布日期:2010-09-20

Fault Attack on Lightweight Block Cipher KeeLoq

YOU Jianxiong1, LI Ruilin1, LI Chao1,2   

  1. 1. Department of Mathematics and System Science, Science College, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073; 2. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
  • Received:2010-05-15 Online:2010-09-20 Published:2010-09-20

摘要: 基于面向字节的随机故障模型, 通过分析 KeeLoq 算法中非线性函数(NLF)的差分性质, 提出了对 KeeLoq 算法的差分故障攻击。理论分析和实验结果表明, 恢复 1 比特密钥信息平均只需要0.707617个错误。

关键词: 分组密码, KeeLoq, 差分故障分析

Abstract: The authors analyse the differential property of the non-linear function (NLF) . By using byte-oriented random fault model, a practical fault analysis attacks on KeeLoq is presented. Theoretical analysis and experiments show that 1-bit key can be recovered through 0.707617 faulty ciphertexts on average.

Key words: block cipher, KeeLoq, differential fault analysis

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