北京大学学报(自然科学版)

环境金融市场定价机制设计:贝叶斯 Nash 实施

于海东1,2,唐文惠2,田启华1,2,罗云峰1   

  1. 1. 华中科技大学系统工程研究所, 武汉 430074; 2. 三峡大学图书馆水电科技情报中心,宜昌443002;
  • 收稿日期:2009-10-21 出版日期:2010-05-20 发布日期:2010-05-20

Pricing Mechanism Design in Environmental Financial Market: Bayesian Nash Implementation

YU Haidong1,2, TANG Wenhui2, TIAN Qihua1, 2, LUO Yunfeng1   

  1. 1. Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074; 2. Hydro-Electric Science and Technology Information Centre, Library of China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002;
  • Received:2009-10-21 Online:2010-05-20 Published:2010-05-20

摘要: 分析了环境金融产品定价差异产生的原因, 并给出环境金融市场的定价机制。证明了定价机制的Nash完全实施的不存在性。通过信号传递博弈模型说明了定价机制的配置规则, 得到不完全信息条件下环境金融产品定价的贝叶斯实施机制, 解释了环境金融产品定价差异的本质。研究表明: 环境金融产品发行人(如金融中介或厂商) 可以通过实施成本向投资者传递其声誉水平的信号, 声誉水平差异导致定价差异进而有助于提高环境金融市场的定价效率。

关键词: 环境金融, 定价, 机制设计

Abstract: The Authors analyzed the cause of the pricing diversification between environmental financial products, then the pricing mechanism in the market was given. It proved that Nash perfect implementation didn’t exist in pricing mechanism. Through a signaling game model, the configuration rule is explained in pricing mechanism and the Bayesian implementation mechanism was gained in imperfect information condition, which revealed the nature of pricing diversification between environmental financial products. The result shows that the issuer of environmental financial product can send its reputation signal to investors through implementation cost, and the reputation diversification results in pricing diversification which is useful to improve pricing efficiency in environmental financial market.

Key words: environmental finance, pricing, mechanism design

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