北京大学学报(自然科学版)

从环境协议收费现象看排污收费政策的缺陷

胡璇, 栾胜基   

  1. 北京大学环境学院,北京,100871
  • 收稿日期:2003-03-08 出版日期:2004-03-20 发布日期:2004-03-20

Analysis On Causes And Function of Environmental Negotiating Charge

HU Xuan, LUAN Shengji   

  1. College of Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing, 100871
  • Received:2003-03-08 Online:2004-03-20 Published:2004-03-20

摘要: 调查显示中国中西部地区的企业环境管理存在一定程度的政策失效,主要表现为在执行排污费政策的过程中普遍存在的协议收费现象。作者认为政策失效是由于排污收费政策本身存在两方面的理论缺陷,即忽略了现实中企业环保投资的成本效果曲线中存在的阈值现象以及排污收费政策在企业资金有限条件下将引起的系统的效用损失;环境协议收费现象的出现是对现行排污收费政策缺陷的一种自发性的响应。

关键词: 阈值现象, 效用损失, 替代方案, 协议收费

Abstract: An investigation shows that there is serious policyfailure in environmental management on industry in midwestern China, which appears as universal negotiating charging of pollutant fee. While the policyfailure is regarded as iniquity in many literatures, the authors believe such a phenomenon has theory foundations: the threshold phenomenon in pollutant treating and utility losing caused by pollutant fee system. Negotiating charge becomes the spontaneous substitution of policy in reality to make up the objections of pollutant fee system.

Key words: negotiating charge, threshold phenomenon, utility losing, substitution

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