Key Extraction Schemes for SRAM PUF

doi:10.13209/j.0479-8023.2017.059

Abstract

Abstract:

To acquire unique and random keys for chips from PUF, key extraction schemes for SRAM PUF are introduced. These schemes include the hard-decision and soft-decision decoding ones involving concatenated error-correcting code. By the actual responses of SRAM PUF’s on chips and software simulation, the effect of above two schemes is verified. The result shows that, for SRAM PUF, the soft-decision scheme is more reliable and efficient.

Key words: PUF, key extraction, concatenated error-correcting code, hard-decision error correction, soft-decision error correction

摘要：

为了利用PUF获得芯片唯一、随机的密钥, 详细分析可用于SRAM PUF的密钥提取方案, 包括采用级联纠错码的硬判决和软判决译码方案。利用芯片上的实际SRAM PUF响应和软件仿真, 验证两种方案的效果。结果表明, 对于SRAM PUF, 软判决方案更加可靠和高效。

关键词: 物理不可克隆函数(PUF), 密钥提取, 级联纠错码, 硬判决纠错, 软判决纠错

Liangliang ZHANG, Yiwei ZHANG, Ruiyi SUN, Yuan ZHOU, Xin’an WANG. Key Extraction Schemes for SRAM PUF[J]. Acta Scientiarum Naturalium Universitatis Pekinensis, 2017, 53(6): 997-1002.

张亮亮, 张翌维, 孙瑞一, 周源, 王新安. 可用于SRAM PUF的密钥提取方案[J]. 北京大学学报自然科学版, 2017, 53(6): 997-1002.

Figures/Tables 3

References 21

[1]	Maes R.Physically unclonable functions: constructions, properties and applications. Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013
[2]	Böhm C, Hofer M.Physical unclonable functions in theory and practice. New York:Springer, 2013
[3]	恩智浦以物理不可克隆技术(PUF)强化 SmartMX2安全芯片.微电脑世界, 2013(4): 17
[4]	Holcomb D E, Burleson W P, Fu K.Initial SRAM state as a fingerprint and source of true random numbers for RFID tags // Workshop on RFID Security and Privacy: RFIDSec 2007. New York: IEEE, 2007
[5]	寇红召, 张紫楠, 马骏. 基于物理不可克隆函数的RFID双向认证. 计算机工程, 2013, 39(6): 142-145
[6]	Gassend B, Clarke D, van Dijk M, et al. Silicon physical random functions // CCS 2002: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York: ACM, 2002: 148-160
[7]	Gassend B, Lim D, Clarke D, et al.Identification and authentication of integrated circuits: research articles. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2004, 16(11): 1077-1098
[8]	Lee J W, Lim D, Gassend B, et al.A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identifi-cation and authentication applications // Symposium on VLSI Circuits-VLSIC 2004. New York: IEEE, 2004: 176-179
[9]	Guajardo J, Kumar S S, Schrijen G J, et al.FPGA intrinsic PUFs and their use for IP protection // Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2007. Berlin: Springer, 2007: 63-80
[10]	Holcomb D E, Burleson W P, Fu K.Power-up SRAM state as an identifying fingerprint and source of true random numbers. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 2009, 58(9): 1198-1210
[11]	Schrijen G J, van der Leest V. Comparative analysis of SRAM memories used as PUF primitives // Design, Automation and Test in Europe-DATE 2012. New York: IEEE, 2012: 1319-1324
[12]	Dodis Y, Reyzin L. Smith A.Fuzzy extractors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data // Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2004. Berlin: Springer, 2004: 523-540
[13]	Dodis Y, Ostrovsky R, Reyzin L, et al.Fuzzy extra-ctors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2008, 38(1): 97-139
[14]	Lin S, Costello D J.Error control coding. 2nd ed. New Jersey:Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2004
[15]	王新梅, 肖国镇. 纠错码——原理与方法(修订版). 西安: 西安电子科技大学出版社, 2001
[16]	Bösch C, Guajardo J, Sadeghi A R, et al.Efficient helper data key extractor on FPGAs // Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2008. Berlin: Springer, 2008: 181-197
[17]	Maes R, van Herrewege A, Verbauwhede I. PUFKY: a fully functional PUF-based cryptographic key generator // Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2012. Berlin: Springer, 2012: 302-319
[18]	Maes R, Tuyls P, Verbauwhede I.Low-overhead implementation of a soft decision helper data algo-rithm for SRAM PUFs // Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2009. Berlin: Springer, 2009: 332-347
[19]	Maes R, Tuyls P, Verbauwhede I.Soft decision helper data algorithm for SRAM PUFs // IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory-ISIT 2009. New York: IEEE, 2009: 2101-2105
[20]	Schnabl G, Bossert M.Soft-decision decoding of Reed-Muller codes as generalized multiple concatenated codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 1995, 41(1): 304-308
[21]	Maes R.An accurate probabilistic reliability model for silicon PUFs // Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2013. Berlin: Springer, 2013: 73-89

方案	内码	外码	x	l	实际失败概率
1	C_rep[7,1,3]	C_BCH[488,299,22]	1	3416	0.16
2	C_rep[7,1,3]	C_BCH[1754,742,105]	1	12278	5×10^-5

方案	内码	外码	x	l	实际失败概率
1	C_rep[7,1,3]	C_BCH[488,299,22]	1	3416	0.16
2	C_rep[7,1,3]	C_BCH[1754,742,105]	1	12278	5×10^-5

方案	内码	外码	x	l	实际失败概率
1	\({{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{rep}}}[3,\ 1,\ 1]\)	\({{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{rep}}}[3,\ 1,\ 1]\)	11	2112	1.6×10^-4
2	RM(2,6)=[64,22,7]	RM(2,7)=[128,29,15]	14	5376	3×10^-5
3	无	RM(2,8)=[256,37,31]	6	1536	4×10^-5
4	无	RM(2,9)=[512,46,63]	7	3584	3×10^-5

方案	内码	外码	x	l	实际失败概率
1	\({{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{rep}}}[3,\ 1,\ 1]\)	\({{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{rep}}}[3,\ 1,\ 1]\)	11	2112	1.6×10^-4
2	RM(2,6)=[64,22,7]	RM(2,7)=[128,29,15]	14	5376	3×10^-5
3	无	RM(2,8)=[256,37,31]	6	1536	4×10^-5
4	无	RM(2,9)=[512,46,63]	7	3584	3×10^-5