关键词: 农户, 环保合作, 演化博弈理论, 稳定性, 选择性激励, 行为重复机制

Abstract: The process of institutional change that environmental cooperative state of rural households changing into environmental non-cooperative state of rural households comes with a cost. In the process, there is an environmental game played repeatedly by rural households. Here evolutionary game theory was used to analyze the evolutionary process and the equilibrium of the environmental game system. A replicator equation was developed to analyze evolutionary stability of the system. Then the source of stochastic disturbance which the process has suffered is analyzed. On this basis, stochastic evolutionary game model was developed to analyze stochastic evolutionary dynamics and stochastic evolutionary stability. Results show that whether environmental cooperation will become the result of the evolution depends on 1) taking into account direct costs and benefits along with losses caused by the positive externalities, environmental behavior is still profitable or not; 2) conventions of the game’s process. To promote current system changing to the system of rural households’ environmental cooperation, one way is to take selective incentives to increase payoffs of rural households who will take environmental behaviors, and those who provide selective incentives measures will commitment the main costs of institutional change; and another way is to establish action-repeating mechanism, making environmental cooperation become the only convention in recent past, and those who provide action-repeating mechanism will commitment the main costs of institutional change.

Key words: rural households, environmental cooperation, evolutionary game theory, stability, selective incentives, action-repeating mechanism