Against the backdrop of funding challenges in the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), to conduct an in-depth analysis of the financial game dynamics between developed and developing countries and explore effective pathways for optimizing financial cooperation mechanisms, this study draws upon the “Global Public Goods” theory and the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, employing a combined methodological approach of comparative case analysis, static evolutionary game modeling, and numerical simulation analysis. It systematically examines the financial game dynamics, dissects the financial interaction mechanisms, and verifies the stability of game equilibria and their evolutionary pathways. The results indicate that national interests and international public opinion pressure are core factors affecting strategic choices. Developed countries choose “active cooperation” or “passive cooperation” in financial aid based on their interests and public pressure, while developing countries choose between “action” and “inaction” based on public pressure. The higher a developed country’s international reputation and environmental benefits, the more likely it is to “actively cooperate”. The greater the international reputational loss a developing country incurs, the more it is spurred to “act”. Developed and developing countries need to find a long-term stable equilibrium in funding games to realize rational allocation and efficient utilization of resources. This research offers a theoretical basis for targeted desertification funding policies and contributes to advancing global desertification governance. 

desertification control, funding game, international cooperation, evolutionary game, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 

针对《联合国防治荒漠化公约》履约进程中资金保障困难的问题, 为探寻优化资金合作机制的有效路径, 基于“全球公共产品”理论与“共同但有区别的责任”原则, 综合运用案例比较法、静态演化博弈模型和数值仿真分析, 系统地梳理发达国家与发展中国家的资金博弈态势, 解析资金互动机制, 验证博弈均衡的稳定性与演化路径。结果表明, 国家利益与国际舆论压力是影响双方策略选择的核心因素。发达国家基于自身利益考量和国际舆论导向, 在资金援助上呈现“积极合作”或“消极合作”两种态度; 发展中国家则因顾忌国际舆论损失, 选择“作为”或“不作为”。发达国家的国际声誉和环境收益越高, 其履约积极性越强, 越倾向于“积极合作”; 发展中国家遭受的国际舆论损失越大, 越能激励其“作为”。发达国家与发展中国家需在资金博弈中寻求长期稳定的均衡点, 以便实现资源的合理分配与高效利用。研究结果可为制定更具针对性的荒漠化防治资金政策提供理论依据, 进而助推全球荒漠化治理进程。